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Baby Boomers Driving Alone? 
The Dynamics of Dissatisfaction with Income Differences 
(1987-2009)
Frédéric Gonthier1
The social sciences have a long tradition of investigating perceived inequalities and their 
legitimacy dating back to Runciman’s pioneering work on relative deprivation (Runci-
man 1966). Recently a great deal of attention has been focused on public attitudes toward 
income inequality. Income inequalities indeed play a prominent role in the public debate 
on social inequality (Bartels 2008; Cingano 2014; McCall 2013; Piketty 2014). Effects of 
these inequalities are known to undermine the bases of social cohesion, such as interper-
sonal trust, trust in institutions or civic participation (Larsen 2013; Rothstein 2011; Zmerli 
and Hooghe 2013).
One of the key findings obtained from the scholarly literature is that ordinary citizens 
do not gauge income inequality on an objective basis, by simply relying on economic news 
and information they receive about the state of their national economy. They also take into 
account their own financial situation and often make comparisons with the living condi-
tions of significant others. More subjective factors pertaining to social justice may come 
into play as well, such as political ideology, where individuals place themselves in the 
social hierarchy, how large they think the gap between top and bottom incomes actually 
is, how large they consider it should be, etc.
Cross-national research has mostly pointed to attitudinal gaps between countries, thus 
showing that dissatisfaction with income gaps and support for redistribution are also 
grounded in national specificities related to work ethics, labor market structure, welfare 
arrangements, and egalitarian or liberal values. However, very few scholars have thor-
oughly examined how dissatisfaction with inequality evolves over time. Far from being a 
fixed process, the way people perceive income inequality may indeed vary as a result of 
many changes occurring at the country-level and at the individual-level.
This study explores the dynamics of tolerance for income inequality. The ISSP Inequal-
ity cumulated dataset offers a unique opportunity to address this issue through the lens of 
longitudinal analysis. The study tracks who contributes the most to the overall change in 
attitudes toward income inequality; i.e. whether some subgroups are more reactive than 
others. A classic question of public opinion research is: Who moves when opinion moves? 
This is usually intended to address elites’ influence over public opinion, i.e. to what extent 
1 An extended version of this study, including additional analyses, has been published 2017 in a 
special issue of the International Journal of Sociology 47(1): 26-42. 
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is change in the general public driven by changes in small minorities of sophisticated and 
enlightened segments of the population?
Here, three subgroups demand closer scrutiny: The wealthy, the better-educated and the 
younger generations. The first two of these groups are usually considered as being more 
responsive to their changing environment. They receive more information, they make 
more accurate assessments, they more easily connect their opinions with what transpires 
in the outside world... (Enns and Kellstedt 2008). Thus, it is plausible to expect that the 
wealthy will contribute to opinion change more than the others. By the same token, income 
inequalities can be less tolerated due to an increasing influence of the most educated seg-
ments of the national populations, presumed to be more sensitive to “post-materialism” 
and to egalitarian values (Inglehart 1977). Likewise, income inequalities may be more 
accepted because people become accustomed to them, and also because older cohorts are 
being replaced by new, more well-educated ones, who are more opposed to income gaps. 
This study finds striking evidence of uniform moves among income groups, educational 
groups and cohorts since the beginning of the 1990s. However, contrary to what could 
be expected, results show that the generational dynamics are partly driven by the Baby 
Boomers’ increasing dissatisfaction toward income inequalities. This counterintuitive find-
ing and its substantive implications are discussed.
Who Moves When Public Opinion on Income Inequality Moves?
In cross-national research it is well known that aggregate trends can conceal impor-
tant variations within countries. It is also well known that economic inequalities can be 
perceived in very different ways, even by people who live in the same country (Lübker 
2004; 2007). This section first investigates whether the wealthy, the most educated and 
the younger generations are becoming more tolerant toward income differences than the 
rest of the national populations. Addressing these subgroups and their opinion moves is of 
critical importance since they are often depicted as “opinion makers”.
Many scholars have found that the have-nots are less likely to update their opinions. 
Given their low levels of political awareness, they receive a minimum of the economic or 
political information available (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997; Converse 1964).2 Therefore, 
they display random or stable survey responses, and are not contributing much to aggre-
gate measures of opinion change (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002; Stimson 2004). By 
contrast, the privileged citizens have access to more information on their economic and 
political environment. Because of this they can respond more quickly and more emphati-
cally. All in all, the wealthiest and the most educated segments of the public should be 
more reactive to their environment, and exhibit more salient patterns of opinion change 
than their less privileged counterparts (Gonthier 2016).
2 Since the ISSP cumulated dataset does not document political competence per se, I fall back on 
education as a reasonable proxy. Education levels indeed relate to political and economic infor-
mation insomuch as they reflect an individual’s exposure to information and ability to consider 
economic and political issues.
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A different rationale applies with cohorts and generational change. Inglehart argues 
that economic security experienced during socialization years could push individuals to 
adopt long-lasting postmaterialist values, thus giving priority to non-economic issues over 
economic security and material comfort. Much of this generational dynamic, Inglehart 
adds, is channeled through rising education levels (Inglehart 1977; 1997). More supportive 
of egalitarian values than their older counterparts, the younger generations should then 
be less tolerant toward income differences since income differences jeopardize individual 
autonomy and expression.3 Therefore, one can expect those born after 1945 to display a 
stronger rejection of inequality. More importantly to note is that although each cohort’s 
level of tolerance of is expected to remain stable over time (since socialization has a life-
long influence), generation renewal should gradually level up dissatisfaction with income 
inequality.
Since the first ISSP Inequality module in 1987, respondents have been asked to position 
themselves on a five-point agreement scale, capturing whether they believe that “income 
differences are too large” in their country. The following figures plot the percentage of 
respondents who agree or strongly agree with this statement in each country and for each 
ISSP wave. 
The analysis begins with income groups. Empirical studies on attitudes toward inequali-
ties and redistribution have repeatedly demonstrated that perceived inequalities are very 
likely to vary among social classes and incomes groups (Kulin and Svallfors 2013; Svall-
fors 2006). In order to isolate the wealthy and the underprivileged, a specific variable 
has been computed, collapsing respondents’ personal income into four equal categories 
for each country and ISSP wave.4 Figure 1 captures the evolution of dissatisfaction with 
income inequalities by country and depending on the two extreme income groups (income 
++ for the upper quartile, income - - for the bottom one).5
Mean levels of dissatisfaction with inequalities (ranging from 1 to 5) are quite high 
everywhere, but the gap dividing the wealthy and the underprivileged is far from being 
identical between countries. It is much more important in rich Western countries (Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, and France) than in Eastern ones (Latvia, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic). Social scientists vary in their views on what ultimately drives individual 
attitudes and behaviors. Following the theory of hedonic rationality, some posit that self-
interest is the major predictor of policy preferences: Ordinary citizens endorse opinions 
which are consistent with their tangible short-term material interests. Others argue that 
self-interested motivations can be countered by general social values: Symbolic predis-
3 Opposite arguments can be voiced. The young are usually portrayed as malleable and easily 
influenced by their external environment, and they have been shown to be more liberal (in 
the European sense) since their views on inequality are mainly shaped by abstract principles 
inherited from school (such as merit). By contrast, their older counterparts are more aware of 
inequality, which they have experienced in its various forms (notably at work).
4 Quartiles have been computed for each country and module so as to define specific income cut 
points with respect to time and space. For caveats when using income variables from the ISSP 
cumulated dataset, see Brien and Bechert 2014, 6.
5 For the sake of clarity, all income groups are not plotted. But the notion of “parallel publics” 
holds with higher-middle and lower-middle income groups. The same goes for intermediate 
educational groups, not displayed in Figure 2.   
106 GESIS Series  |  Volume 17
Frédéric Gonthier | Baby Boomers Driving Alone 
positions acquired through socialization in early life exert the strongest effect (Sears and 
Funk 1991; Chong, Citrin and Conley 2001).
Figure 1 provides evidence for both assumptions. Income groups may be divided in rich 
Western countries because the wealthy and the have-nots stick to their personal inter-
ests, with the former “understating” income differences they benefit from, and the latter 
“emphasizing” income differences they do not benefit from. But income groups may be 
divided as well because their views on social inequalities are shaped by different justice 
principles. The wealthy may, for instance, consider that income differences are not too 
large because they mostly value individual responsibility. And the lowest income groups 
may conversely assess income differences with stronger preferences for equality and redis-
tribution. The fact that income groups from Eastern countries similarly gauge income dif-
ferences can be explained just the same way. They may share the same perception of their 
economic environment as being very unequal; and they may also be united by a common 
set of values leading them to reject income differences.
Most importantly, Figure 1 reveals that respondents tend to move in the same direction 
and at the same moment whether they are rich or poor. This hypothesis of uniform patterns 
among various subgroups has first been formalized in the U.S. context (Page and Shapiro 
1992). Recently, Ura and Ellis have observed only marginal differences into how income 
quartiles respond to economic stimuli, with the wealthy showing a stronger reactivity 
(2008). Analyzing why the general public becomes less supportive of government expan-
sion, Kelly and Enns also stated that low- and high-income groups respond in the same 
way to increasing income inequalities (Kelly and Enns 2010). Other studies came to the 
same conclusion of uniform opinion moves in other liberal regimes (Soroka and Wlezien 
2009). Results from the ISSP Inequality modules tend to substantiate this “parallel publics” 
hypothesis. Even though income groups appear to be fiercely divided on income differ-
ences in many countries, their parallel movements give some credence to the idea that 
individuals respond in similar ways to stimuli coming from their changing environment 
(Enns and Kellstedt 2008).
With Figure 2, the study turns to educational subgroups. The figure charts opinion 
moves on income differences for two opposite segments: Respondents with no formal 
qualification or lowest formal qualification versus those above higher secondary level, 
with a university degree completed or with graduate studies. With the exception of Chile 
and the Philippines, the least educated are everywhere more dissatisfied with income dif-
ferences. However, gaps between educational groups appear to be much smaller than those 
observed among income groups. Scholars usually consider that education has an ambiva-
lent influence on how inequalities are perceived. On the one hand, people with higher 
education are more likely to believe in meritocratic ideology and value self-achievement 
(Andreß and Heien 2001, 348). But on the other hand, education is related to socialization 
to democratic values and tolerance. Therefore, the most educated are supposed to express 
stronger preferences for social equality. This balanced effect of education might explain 
why the most and the least educated segments do not display very different levels of toler-
ance for income inequalities.
Moreover, contrary to what could be expected, the most and the least educated segments 
of the public display very uniform variations. This result is also in line with the literature 
about parallel opinion movement on economic issues. For instance, with data from the 
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General Social Survey and the National Election Studies, Enns and Kellstedt have described 
how the least and the most sophisticated strata of American society change their opinions 
toward the economy in sync (Enns and Kellstedt 2008). Yet, once again, these two groups 
at opposite ends of the spectrum, the most and the least well-educated, appear to update 
their opinion in a very uniform way.
Figure 3 sketches the same picture for the various generations. Cohort cut points have 
been chosen according to accepted sociological categories: Those born in 1945 and before 
correspond to the “Silent Generation”; if born between 1946 and 1959 then “Baby Boomers”; 
between 1960 and 1980 called “Generation X” (also called “Gen Xers”); and if born after 
1980 known as “Generation Y” (aka “Millennials”) (Howe and Strauss 1992; Strauss and 
Howe 1997).6 Respondents from the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers and Gen Xers exhibit 
very similar levels of tolerance for income inequalities. This finding is somewhat counterin-
tuitive, since Baby Boomers and Gen Xers were expected to be much more dissatisfied with 
income inequality than their older counterparts. When it comes to attitudes toward income 
differences, birth cohort may not be as influential as income and educational background. 
In some countries (Bulgaria, France, Italy, Latvia, Switzerland or the U.S.), Baby Boomers 
do indeed display a slightly stronger rejection. Still, in many other countries, baby boomers 
and Gen Xers do not obviously stand out as the strongest supporters of income equality. 
They even seem to be outperformed by respondents from the silent generation.
At the country level cohorts tend to move in parallel, which is consistent with the 
notion that predispositions acquired through early socialization last throughout the life 
cycle. It confirms that the national context matters much for opinion change, and that it 
exerts the same influence on all segments of the public. However, one can also observe 
that Baby Boomers seem to be a little more mobile than other cohorts. This is notably the 
case in Israel, Japan and Sweden, where they carry an upward trend toward more dissat-
isfaction with income differences. It is as if the Baby Boomers were more reactive to their 
external environment. Since mean values provide a crude measurement of subgroup dif-
ferences, this cohort effect calls for closer scrutiny. More advanced statistical techniques 
will be applied to addressing this in the next section.
In short, noteworthy here is that all segments of the national populations conform to the 
global pattern and exhibit the same trend toward more or less dissatisfaction with income 
inequalities. These findings comply with studies demonstrating that individuals incorpo-
rate information about economic changes in similar ways, and update their opinions in 
unison. Although it has long been argued that the general public is not interested in poli-
tics or the economy and lacks the knowledge to develop informed preferences (Converse 
1964), results from the ISSP Inequality modules suggest that all citizens pay some atten-
tion and respond uniformly – though in varying degrees – to their changing environment.7
6 Other cut points are possible. Political generations could prove useful (Sears and Valentino 
1997). However, their major downside for cross-national analysis is that political milestones 
often vary from one country to the other. In Figure 4, the Millennials are not presented since 
their number is very limited in 1999 (n = 569 for the twenty-seven countries examined).
7 Since ISSP Inequality does not include variables tapping “sociotropic perceptions” (i.e., percep-
tions arising out of concern for the well-being of national economic life in general), it is labori-
ous to find out to which aspects of their environment individuals respond to or ignore.
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How Cohorts Shape the Dynamics of Dissatisfaction with Income 
Differences
To clarify how characteristics of individuals and countries combine, different multilevel 
linear models were performed, regressing on dissatisfaction with income differences. The 
major focus of multilevel modeling is to account for micro-level variations in a dependent 
variable while controlling for variations in the mean response between different macro-
levels of analysis.8 In order to disentangle the impact of the ISSP waves and the impact of 
the countries, a three-level modeling strategy was used, with countries at the upper level 
(n=27), waves crossed by countries at the middle level (n=78), and individuals at the bot-
tom level (n=98,557 for the first model). This methodological approach has proven appro-
priate for cross-national analysis with comparative longitudinal survey datasets (Fair-
brother 2014). The dependent variable is dissatisfaction with income gap in its initial form 
of a five-point agreement scale. The larger a coefficient, the more respondents are prone to 
think that income differences are large.
Table 1 presents models estimating the influence of different individual-level and wave/
country-level indicators on dissatisfaction with income differences. Model 1 is a first 
step showing only the variance explained by the three nested levels. This model with no 
explanatory variable gauges whether dissatisfaction with income differences is more likely 
explained by differences within countries, across waves or across countries. The intraclass 
correlation coefficients indicate that around 11 percent of the variance can be attributed 
to the country-level, while around 14 percent can be explained by the waves. Most of the 
variance of the dependent variable comes then from the individual-level. It simply means 
that dissatisfaction with income differences depends more on differences between indi-
viduals than on differences between countries or between ISSP modules. It gives a first 
hint about the fact that individuals differ much more than countries with regard to their 
views on income inequality.
Model 2 introduces the variables displayed in previous figures so as to assess their direct 
effects with all other variables held constant. It confirms many correlations already stated 
in the literature in support of state redistribution (see e.g. Linos and West 2003; Svallfors 
1997). Gender has a significant but modest impact, whereas women are more dissatisfied 
with income inequalities than men. Tolerance for income inequalities decreases with age 
but increases with educational level.9 Being one year older adds 0.002 point to the propen-
sity for being dissatisfied with income differences; while moving up from one educational 
level to another reduces this propensity by 0.054. Not surprisingly, income is more influ-
8 Multilevel modeling is particularly appropriate for cases where individuals are clustered within 
different units. While ordinary least squares regression assumes restrictive hypotheses as to 
independence of error terms and homoscedasticity, multilevel modeling accounts for both the 
dependency of observations and the heterogeneity between error terms. On the one hand, it per-
mits a more complex specification of the residuals that are estimated at an individual-level and 
at an aggregate level. On the other hand, instead of constraining the variance of the residuals to 
be constant, it lets them vary depending on explanatory variables in order to assess variability 
between observed groups (see e.g., Snijders and Bosker 2012).
9 Educational level divides across five categories: No formal qualification or lowest formal quali-
fication; above lowest qualification; higher secondary completed; above higher secondary level.
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ential than other sociodemographics.10 Being worse-off (income quartiles - - and income 
quartile -) increases the probability of rejecting income inequalities by 0.26 and 0.289 
points. Here the magnitude of the coefficient represents a 5 percent increase of the five-
point scale dependent variable (0.26/5X100).
Table 1 Multilevel analysis of dissatisfaction with income differences (1987-2009)
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
  coef. p.value coef. p.value coef. p.value
Women (ref. Men)   .052 *** .049 ***
Age   .002 *** .017 ***
Age squared   -.0001 ***
Educational level    -.054 ***  -.054 ***
Income DKNA (ref. Income ++)   .175 *** .191 ***
Income --   .260 *** .278 ***
Income -   .289 *** .298 ***
Income +   .232 *** .236 ***
Baby Boomers (ref. Silent generation)   .044 *** -.101 **
Generation X   .010 -.097 *
Generation Y   -.046 * -.087 *
Silent Generation 1992 (ref. 1987)      -.082 ***
Silent Generation 1999      -.066***
Silent Generation 2009     -.031
Baby Boomers 1992 (ref. 1987)     .212 ***
Baby Boomers 1999     .287 ***
Baby Boomers 2009     .226 ***
Gen X 1992 (ref. 1987)      -.020
Gen X 1999     .029
Gen X 2009      .014
Gen Y 2009 (ref. 1999)      .034
Intercept 4.14 *** 3.94 *** 3.53 ***
N individual level) 98,557 97,362 97,362
N (country/wave level) 78 78 78
N (country level) 27 27 27
Country - Intraclass correlation coefficient .107 ** .104 ** .105 **
Country/wave - Intraclass correlation coefficient .138 ** .137 ** .126 **
Note: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 
10 Income categories have been computed as dummy variables to also introduce in the model 
those respondents for which income is not documented (Income DKNA). They account for 21% 
(n=22,204) of the cumulated sample.
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The results for cohorts are more mixed. Consistent with expectations, Baby Boom-
ers appear more prone to rejecting income inequalities than respondents from the silent 
generation when other variables are held at their mean. This substantiates the idea that, 
contrary to the silent generation which experienced the war and grew up fighting for 
material resources, post-scarcity generations value more equality and improvement of liv-
ing standards (Inglehart 1997). However, though the coefficient for the Baby Boomers is 
significant, its magnitude remains very modest (0.044) compared to the effect of income. 
Contrary to expectations, the cohort effect is far from being linear. Gen Xers are not sig-
nificantly more dissatisfied with income inequality than their counterparts from the silent 
generation. And Millennials even seem less dissatisfied than the elderly. Though caution 
is warranted due to the small sample size of this segment, this result suggests that a less 
lucky and less privileged cohort such as the Millennials might be more tolerant to income 
inequalities (Willetts 2011). Thus, the major divide in attitudes toward income inequalities 
may be more between Baby Boomers and younger cohorts than between scarcity- and 
post-scarcity generations.
To make sense of these differences and to account for the fact that cohort effects may 
vary over time, another model was estimated introducing a wave-specific variable for each 
generation.11 The results are striking. Model 3 reveals that most of the dynamic inherent 
in the cohort effect comes from the Baby Boomers. Compared to being a Baby Boomer in 
1987, being a Baby Boomer in 2009 (0.226) in 1999 (0.287) and in 1992 (0.212) increases 
the likelihood of rejecting income inequalities to the same extent as belonging to a dis-
advantaged income group (0.278). As for other cohorts, the effects are not as clear cut or 
as significant. All other variables held at their mean, respondents from Generation X and 
from Generation Y are not significantly more dissatisfied over time.12
Figure 4 provides a more vivid picture of who drives the generational dynamic of tol-
erance for income differences as it plots the predicted values for the dependent variable 
of Model 3, conditioning on cohorts and ISSP waves. The median-spline curve substanti-
ates the fact that the upward trend for the Baby Boomers dates from the beginning of the 
1990s, as is also shown by Model 3.13 Baby boomers clearly stand out in that their slope is 
not only steeper than the mean slope; it is also steeper than the slope of their older coun-
terparts from the Silent Generation and it is steeper than that of their younger counterparts 
from Generation X as well. This pattern is robust. It holds when countries are examined 
11 To also account for the fact that the effect age has may not be linear for all age groups, age 
squared has been included in the model. The positive effect of age combined with the negative 
effect of age squared, indicates that the relation between age and tolerance toward income dif-
ferences is more a quadratic than a linear relation; i.e., the impact of age on dissatisfaction with 
income inequality becomes less important as people get older.
12 Finer-grained analyses could be conducted. A similar wave-specific variable for income groups 
could be included in order to compare their effects with those of cohort groups. Interaction 
effects could also be computed to disentangle income and cohort, and to account for the fact 
that Baby Boomers may drive the generational dynamic simply because of their improved living 
standards. Such analyses are, however, beyond the scope of this study.     
13 To make sure that it is not an artefact coming from the different number of countries in ISSP 
waves, additional analyses were performed using the exact same countries for the last two 
waves. Results display an identical upward slope for the Baby Boomers.
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individually. To put it simply, Baby Boomers tend to become more dissatisfied since 1992 
with income inequalities, while respondents from Generation X and the Silent Generation 
tend to follow the average trend. 
This finding suggests that generational renewal will pull down dissatisfaction with 
income inequality, because of Baby Boomers leaving the scene and being replaced by 
younger cohorts not as sensitive to income differences. However, additional analyses (not 
presented here) demonstrate that all cohorts tend to grow less tolerant toward income gaps 
from the age of thirty years onwards. Thus, even though generational renewal will fuel 
tolerance for inequality, younger cohorts will still become more dissatisfied with income 
differences as they get older.
Figure 4  Predicted dissatisfaction with income differences by wave, depending on cohort  
(Model 3)
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Conclusion: Baby Boomers Driving Alone?
Attitudes toward income inequalities have been garnering increased attention from cross-
national research. Most scholars address the issue of opinion change by focusing on aggre-
gate trends at the national-level. Using comparable data from twenty-seven countries and 
at four different time-points, this article first showed that changes in tolerance for income 
differences are not connected with changes in actual income differences. In line with prior 
research, this suggests that individuals mainly respond to how they perceive changes in 
income inequalities. A complementary perspective was then adopted, disentangling aggre-
gate trends to examine changes among opinion groups. Whereas one could have expected 
the wealthy and the most educated to be more responsive, they tend to move in tandem 
with their less privileged counterparts. Put differently, all segments of the public seem to 
react evenly to economic and political stimuli they receive from their outside environment. 
Yet, since the ISSP cumulated dataset does not document respondents’ views on changes in 
inequality, it is difficult to dig further into what individuals are responding to when they 
grow more or less dissatisfied with income differences.
There are also parallel movements among cohorts over time, indicating that contextual 
messages can account for attitudinal change even when individuals have been socialized 
in different circumstances. However, in sharp contrast with the literature predicting that 
post-scarcity generations will be less tolerant toward income inequality, it can be shown 
that this is only the case for Baby Boomers. Respondents from both Generation X and the 
Millennials are not more dissatisfied with income differences than respondents from the 
Silent Generation. Surprisingly, compared to their younger counterparts, Baby Boomers 
are those most opposed to income differences, even tending to become more opposed to 
income differences than other cohorts since the early 1990s. All in all, Baby Boomers seem 
to be driving the generational dynamics of dissatisfaction with income inequality.
Two explanations can be put forward. The first stresses the influence of the environment 
on attitudes toward inequality. The 1980s are known to be a liberal turn (in the European 
sense) for both economy and politics in many countries (see e.g. Schmidt and Thatcher 
2013). One can presume that Gen Xers and Millennials are more tolerant toward income 
inequalities since they have entered working life or been socialized in a more liberal con-
text than Baby Boomers. Still, this line of argument leaves one aspect of the generational 
puzzle unaccounted for: How can Gen Xers and Millennials be that influenced by the 
economic and political climate, since many of them have been raised by Baby Boomers 
socialized in a less liberal context?
An additional explanation relates to generational conflicts and to age-group compe-
tition for social resources. It is often said that Baby Boomers have come to possess a 
monopoly on economic and social wealth, notably in continental European welfare states 
(Chauvel 2010; Chauvel and Schröder 2014). They enter retirement age with more dispos-
able income and more generous pensions than any previous cohorts, leaving future cohorts 
facing increasing social risks and no real hope of living standards improving throughout 
their adult lives. Generational resentment may well influence how Gen Xers and Millenni-
als value income equality. It may, for instance, increase their urge for financial recognition, 
and mitigate their will to level out income differences.
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